Jul 17, 2015 02:31 AM
(This post was last modified: Nov 1, 2015 07:00 PM by Emoticon.)
I'd like to take this final moment before going to sleep (hopefully) for the night to address something that I feel very strongly about. exploit.im's Jabber service.
There is no TL;DR or summary to what I have to say below. Either read it or don't.
I suppose it would be appropriate to start out by introducing its owner, Ivan Baskov, also known as Dest31337. Ivan attempts to attack everyone who targets his XMPP service. He feels very strongly about his ability to scam and otherwise con people while communicating securely with his partners in crime through his XMPP service. Somewhat recently, somebody attacked and hijacked his domain. I'm hearing that there was a database leak for this service, but I haven't been able to confirm it. While he somewhat quickly responded to the attack, it seems that he learned the power he could claim by leaving the security standards similar to how they were when the service was compromised. This lead to how it is today.
Today, exploit.im is still fairly active (especially among a community of teenagers who want to fit in and look like 1337 h4x0rs.) What they don't realize is that any non-OTR conversations are being logged and scanned for any sensitive information, and that their passwords are being stored in clear-text format (meaning the administrators can see your password). Generally the first message of a conversation is the most likely to be left unencrypted, because "automatic OTR" waits for the first message at times. Anything that looks remotely sensitive can and will be used against you by the service's administrator(s).
Yesterday, I saw that Rory Guidry (also known as KMS, Agent KMS, and Rory Andrew Godfrey [pseudonym]) was arrested in the multinational Darkode takedown operation. His username on Darkode was "[email protected]", and many of the chat logs that were recovered and could potentially be used against him are from XMPP via exploit.im.
This next bit is a little more personal to me, and is actually one of the primary reasons (apart from what is mentioned in the above paragraph) why I am writing this out to everyone. Being an XMPP service administrator is not easy, you deal with many frauds and scammers attempting to use your service as a safe haven. The idea behind my service is dead-set privacy. No IP logging (except in special security occasions), absulotely no message stanza logging of any form.
This became very difficult when I was contacted by the primary administrator of the Exploit.IM service, Ivan. I do not speak fully fluent Russian, because I have not spoken it in quite a few years. I preferred my Russian over his English, since it made no sense. We exchanged messages, and apparently one of my service's users was harassing his friend. He wanted me to give up logs on the user, threatened to "root" (compromise) my services to obtain what he wanted. Obviously I declined, even had I accepted there was no information to hand over.
This is when the attacks begun.
At first it was just a few registrations a day, which I noticed due to flood flags in the security audit log. I thought nothing of it. Next thing I knew, every single one of the accounts was spamming a single user of the xmpp.jp service. At this point I realized that my service had just become a vector for somebody's denial of service attack against the xmpp.jp service (which I respect). Instantly I put the service in rate-limiting mode. One message a minute. Any users here that use my service may have experienced that for the hour it was activated, but I wouldn't count on it.
Once I found and unregistered the accounts involved in the attack (over 100), I turned my attention to prevention of future attacks. For weeks, any countermeasure I would put in place the attacker would circumvent it. At one point the primary goal of the attack was to fill up hard drive space (logs) and consume CPU resources (which actually caused slightly noticeable service-wide lagging). This attack was launched using error stanzas, which weren't blocked by my countermeasures (at the time).
For over two weeks, I had to worry about my free privacy-oriented XMPP service being attacked by somebody who was clearly associated with Baskov. I spoke to him again and taunted him a little bit, so he obviously hired somebody to take down my XMPP service with a layer 4 (UDP with what seems to be a CHARGEN amplification) attack. Since I was, at the time, using direct [censored] connection for my XMPP service, it went down rather quickly. I have since added DDoS filtering.
Exploit.IM has caused me a lot of problems, and after reading this I hope you understand that it has the potential to cause you a lot of problems as well. Please take this into consideration when registering or advertising your JID.
Since I'm talking about XMPP, I might as well mention that my XMPP service is open and available for registration. I don't spy on you or compromise your security for my personal gain like Baskov does. Read up on it here: https://xor.li/
Obviously, if anyone has any questions or comments, you can reply here. A more private method of contacting me would be to add me as a contact on XMPP/Jabber. My JID is [email protected].
Thanks for reading.
There is no TL;DR or summary to what I have to say below. Either read it or don't.
I suppose it would be appropriate to start out by introducing its owner, Ivan Baskov, also known as Dest31337. Ivan attempts to attack everyone who targets his XMPP service. He feels very strongly about his ability to scam and otherwise con people while communicating securely with his partners in crime through his XMPP service. Somewhat recently, somebody attacked and hijacked his domain. I'm hearing that there was a database leak for this service, but I haven't been able to confirm it. While he somewhat quickly responded to the attack, it seems that he learned the power he could claim by leaving the security standards similar to how they were when the service was compromised. This lead to how it is today.
Today, exploit.im is still fairly active (especially among a community of teenagers who want to fit in and look like 1337 h4x0rs.) What they don't realize is that any non-OTR conversations are being logged and scanned for any sensitive information, and that their passwords are being stored in clear-text format (meaning the administrators can see your password). Generally the first message of a conversation is the most likely to be left unencrypted, because "automatic OTR" waits for the first message at times. Anything that looks remotely sensitive can and will be used against you by the service's administrator(s).
Yesterday, I saw that Rory Guidry (also known as KMS, Agent KMS, and Rory Andrew Godfrey [pseudonym]) was arrested in the multinational Darkode takedown operation. His username on Darkode was "[email protected]", and many of the chat logs that were recovered and could potentially be used against him are from XMPP via exploit.im.
This next bit is a little more personal to me, and is actually one of the primary reasons (apart from what is mentioned in the above paragraph) why I am writing this out to everyone. Being an XMPP service administrator is not easy, you deal with many frauds and scammers attempting to use your service as a safe haven. The idea behind my service is dead-set privacy. No IP logging (except in special security occasions), absulotely no message stanza logging of any form.
This became very difficult when I was contacted by the primary administrator of the Exploit.IM service, Ivan. I do not speak fully fluent Russian, because I have not spoken it in quite a few years. I preferred my Russian over his English, since it made no sense. We exchanged messages, and apparently one of my service's users was harassing his friend. He wanted me to give up logs on the user, threatened to "root" (compromise) my services to obtain what he wanted. Obviously I declined, even had I accepted there was no information to hand over.
This is when the attacks begun.
At first it was just a few registrations a day, which I noticed due to flood flags in the security audit log. I thought nothing of it. Next thing I knew, every single one of the accounts was spamming a single user of the xmpp.jp service. At this point I realized that my service had just become a vector for somebody's denial of service attack against the xmpp.jp service (which I respect). Instantly I put the service in rate-limiting mode. One message a minute. Any users here that use my service may have experienced that for the hour it was activated, but I wouldn't count on it.
Once I found and unregistered the accounts involved in the attack (over 100), I turned my attention to prevention of future attacks. For weeks, any countermeasure I would put in place the attacker would circumvent it. At one point the primary goal of the attack was to fill up hard drive space (logs) and consume CPU resources (which actually caused slightly noticeable service-wide lagging). This attack was launched using error stanzas, which weren't blocked by my countermeasures (at the time).
For over two weeks, I had to worry about my free privacy-oriented XMPP service being attacked by somebody who was clearly associated with Baskov. I spoke to him again and taunted him a little bit, so he obviously hired somebody to take down my XMPP service with a layer 4 (UDP with what seems to be a CHARGEN amplification) attack. Since I was, at the time, using direct [censored] connection for my XMPP service, it went down rather quickly. I have since added DDoS filtering.
Exploit.IM has caused me a lot of problems, and after reading this I hope you understand that it has the potential to cause you a lot of problems as well. Please take this into consideration when registering or advertising your JID.
Since I'm talking about XMPP, I might as well mention that my XMPP service is open and available for registration. I don't spy on you or compromise your security for my personal gain like Baskov does. Read up on it here: https://xor.li/
Obviously, if anyone has any questions or comments, you can reply here. A more private method of contacting me would be to add me as a contact on XMPP/Jabber. My JID is [email protected].
Thanks for reading.




![[Image: Go9NL9v.png]](https://i.imgur.com/Go9NL9v.png)
