Jan 25, 2025 02:41 PM
(This post was last modified: Nov 19, 2025 08:29 AM by Hackers.)
Many machines continue to fail basic audits for hash verification checks in the case of a null or otherwise missing comparison hash.
This specifically focuses on ES&S machines. I am sharing this so that there is awareness, and so that election software / hardware can be secured in 2028 & further.
It does seem like a golden opportunity for any software devs looking to create a new company to offer this service. I think any computer programmer can agree that these ES&S bugs are problematic at best, and negligent at worst.
Here are some links on this:
https://www.zetter-zeroday.com/votings-h...he-system/
https://robertjrei.substack.com/p/how-to...l-election
https://freespeechforpeople.org/wp-conte...111324.pdf
ECO Analysis ESS 1188.pdf
https://github.com/LNodesL/files/blob/ma...10-aug.pdf
https://github.com/LNodesL/files/blob/ma...eports.pdf
https://github.com/LNodesL/files/blob/ma...10-sec.pdf
https://github.com/LNodesL/files/blob/ma...ort2-1.pdf
Voting Machine Hashcode Testing Unsurprisingly insecure and surprisingly insecure.pdf
EVS 6060 Test Plan Rev 04 508_0.pdf
https://github.com/LNodesL/files/blob/ma...A-2016.pdf
6.1 has the empty hash bug:
https://www.zetter-zeroday.com/content/f...10-aug.pdf
![[Image: Screenshot-2025-01-25-170014.png]](https://i.ibb.co/6vQQ87b/Screenshot-2025-01-25-170014.png)
6.2 doesn't specifically say this was resolved in its list of updates, AND it has another bug related to hash verifications. This is important:
"networking outage" (uhh???) can cause SSL to fail - which is used for software authenticity checks... Interesting:
https://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/fo...vs6200.pdf
https://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/fo...report.pdf
The thing with 6.2 is it also uses Powershell and a modifiable operating system, and specifically uses a USB based verification process:
![[Image: Screenshot-2025-01-25-165542.png]](https://i.ibb.co/nz1GkBH/Screenshot-2025-01-25-165542.png)
This was flagged by the state too:
![[Image: Screenshot-2025-01-25-165402.png]](https://i.ibb.co/p13dnkj/Screenshot-2025-01-25-165402.png)
Here's another note that does mention that the improvement of a static list of hashes is an improvement.
One thing that has been noted in a few audits is that the auditors explain the primary issues of the outdated software, potential bugs, etc, but then must write a letter of authenticity as long as the verification hash works with normal inputs. So they will not for example disqualify a machine that is easily hacked, if under legal regular use by an honest person it would work. This essentially means they are highly vulnerable in the hands of anyone with the intent to hack and manipulate voting results, but they are legally able to be used in an election.
![[Image: Screenshot-2025-01-25-165313.png]](https://i.ibb.co/hX642rQ/Screenshot-2025-01-25-165313.png)
What this means:
- The verification script, Powershell, is run by the auditor on the same machine as the vote tabulation software
- The only requirement is that the current software / stub hash matches to a list of static hashes
So, in review...
It is using an outdated OS - Ubuntu 16
The SSL required for hashing in their 6.2 version fails when there is a networking issue
6.1 contains a unique error where an empty comparison hash can trigger a TRUE / SUCCESS verification result
Outdated software is not a new trend:
![[Image: Figure-1-Machines-At-Least-10-Years-Old.png]](https://cip.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Figure-1-Machines-At-Least-10-Years-Old.png)
For further information, here is a map of the distribution of voting tabulation machine brands:
This specifically focuses on ES&S machines. I am sharing this so that there is awareness, and so that election software / hardware can be secured in 2028 & further.
It does seem like a golden opportunity for any software devs looking to create a new company to offer this service. I think any computer programmer can agree that these ES&S bugs are problematic at best, and negligent at worst.
Here are some links on this:
https://www.zetter-zeroday.com/votings-h...he-system/
https://robertjrei.substack.com/p/how-to...l-election
https://freespeechforpeople.org/wp-conte...111324.pdf
ECO Analysis ESS 1188.pdf
https://github.com/LNodesL/files/blob/ma...10-aug.pdf
https://github.com/LNodesL/files/blob/ma...eports.pdf
https://github.com/LNodesL/files/blob/ma...10-sec.pdf
https://github.com/LNodesL/files/blob/ma...ort2-1.pdf
Voting Machine Hashcode Testing Unsurprisingly insecure and surprisingly insecure.pdf
EVS 6060 Test Plan Rev 04 508_0.pdf
https://github.com/LNodesL/files/blob/ma...A-2016.pdf
6.1 has the empty hash bug:
https://www.zetter-zeroday.com/content/f...10-aug.pdf
![[Image: Screenshot-2025-01-25-170014.png]](https://i.ibb.co/6vQQ87b/Screenshot-2025-01-25-170014.png)
6.2 doesn't specifically say this was resolved in its list of updates, AND it has another bug related to hash verifications. This is important:
"networking outage" (uhh???) can cause SSL to fail - which is used for software authenticity checks... Interesting:
https://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/fo...vs6200.pdf
https://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/fo...report.pdf
The thing with 6.2 is it also uses Powershell and a modifiable operating system, and specifically uses a USB based verification process:
![[Image: Screenshot-2025-01-25-165542.png]](https://i.ibb.co/nz1GkBH/Screenshot-2025-01-25-165542.png)
This was flagged by the state too:
![[Image: Screenshot-2025-01-25-165402.png]](https://i.ibb.co/p13dnkj/Screenshot-2025-01-25-165402.png)
Here's another note that does mention that the improvement of a static list of hashes is an improvement.
One thing that has been noted in a few audits is that the auditors explain the primary issues of the outdated software, potential bugs, etc, but then must write a letter of authenticity as long as the verification hash works with normal inputs. So they will not for example disqualify a machine that is easily hacked, if under legal regular use by an honest person it would work. This essentially means they are highly vulnerable in the hands of anyone with the intent to hack and manipulate voting results, but they are legally able to be used in an election.
![[Image: Screenshot-2025-01-25-165313.png]](https://i.ibb.co/hX642rQ/Screenshot-2025-01-25-165313.png)
What this means:
- The verification script, Powershell, is run by the auditor on the same machine as the vote tabulation software
- The only requirement is that the current software / stub hash matches to a list of static hashes
So, in review...
It is using an outdated OS - Ubuntu 16
The SSL required for hashing in their 6.2 version fails when there is a networking issue
6.1 contains a unique error where an empty comparison hash can trigger a TRUE / SUCCESS verification result
Outdated software is not a new trend:
![[Image: Figure-1-Machines-At-Least-10-Years-Old.png]](https://cip.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Figure-1-Machines-At-Least-10-Years-Old.png)
For further information, here is a map of the distribution of voting tabulation machine brands:



![[Image: QKolAka.png]](https://i.imgur.com/QKolAka.png)

![[Image: O444cFs.jpg]](https://i.ibb.co/c2rr5jw/O444cFs.jpg)