Py-Dev Threat Intelligence-Ep 4: Clipper
Posted Mar 23, 2025 10:59 AM
![[Image: Ao15uxN.gif]](https://imgur.com/Ao15uxN.gif)
Clipper Malware Breakdown: Inside a Real-World Crypto Clipboard Hijacker
![[Image: h9AAT39.gif]](https://imgur.com/h9AAT39.gif)
Overview
Cryptocurrency clipper malware is one of the simplest but most effective tactics used by financially motivated adversaries. The attack surface is simple: most crypto users copy/paste wallet addresses. Clipper malware hijacks this moment and silently replaces the clipboard contents with an attacker-controlled address.
In this post, we’ll dissect a live clipper sample called CoinClipper, analyze how it operates, and give both red team and blue team takeaways you can use in your engagements or defense.
![[Image: h9AAT39.gif]](https://imgur.com/h9AAT39.gif)
🔧 Technical Analysis
1. Initial Execution:
Upon launch, the binary executes a randomized sleep or CPU delay mechanism through the `Snoozy` class. This includes:
- Thread.Sleep with variable delays
- Progressive sleep with interleaved CPU load
- CPU-bound loops using sqrt/log for anti-analysis
![[Image: h9AAT39.gif]](https://imgur.com/h9AAT39.gif)
2. Self-Replication & Persistence:
The malware checks `%APPDATA%\Microsoft\SystemData` and replicates itself there under a randomized name like `ServiceHost83dsx.exe`. A marker file (`installed.txt`) stores the path.
Startup persistence is achieved via:
- PowerShell script that launches the replicated EXE
- VBScript launcher dropped in the user's Startup folder
Red team note: This approach avoids direct registry modifications, helping avoid some AV triggers.
![[Image: h9AAT39.gif]](https://imgur.com/h9AAT39.gif)
3. Clipboard Hijack Engine:
The heart of the malware uses a hidden `Form` with `AddClipboardFormatListener` to listen for clipboard updates (via `WM_CLIPBOARDUPDATE`). When fired:
- Current clipboard text is checked for known wallet patterns (BTC, ETH, XMR, etc.)
- Matches are replaced using regex and static attacker-controlled addresses
- If a change was made, clipboard content is overwritten with the replaced text
Supported cryptocurrencies:
- Bitcoin (BTC)
- Ethereum (ETH)
- Tron (TRC20)
- Litecoin (LTC)
- Dogecoin (DOGE)
- Monero (XMR)
- Ripple (XRP)
Blue team note: Clipboard monitoring using `AddClipboardFormatListener` is a strong signal for userland malware behavior.
![[Image: h9AAT39.gif]](https://imgur.com/h9AAT39.gif)
4. Threading and Stealth:
The clipboard monitor runs in a background STA thread, keeping the main process quiet. The main loop simply idles with 10-second sleeps. No GUI, no output, no window—fully hidden.
![[Image: h9AAT39.gif]](https://imgur.com/h9AAT39.gif)
🔥 Red Team Tips
- OpSec Matters: Use randomized filenames and sleep delays to blend into user activity.
- Non-Invasive Persistence: Avoid registry changes; userland Startup folder + VBScript is often overlooked by EDRs.
- Regex Diversity: Regex-based swapping means you can expand to other formats (e.g., Solana, Cardano, BNB).
- Encrypted Config: For better OPSEC, load addresses from an encrypted JSON or remote config over C2.
- Pair with RATs: Combine this tool with a RAT to exfiltrate clipboard history or receive real-time swap logs.
![[Image: h9AAT39.gif]](https://imgur.com/h9AAT39.gif)
🛡️ Blue Team Tips
- Monitor Startup Folder: Watch for unexpected `.vbs` or `.ps1` scripts appearing in `%APPDATA%`, `%Startup%`, etc.
- Clipboard Hooks: Flag processes that register for `WM_CLIPBOARDUPDATE` but lack a GUI.
- Regex Matching: If clipboard text matches known crypto formats AND suddenly changes, that's a high-fidelity IOC.
- Behavioral Heuristics: A non-GUI app that sleeps, copies itself, creates scripts, and monitors the clipboard is highly suspicious.
- YARA Opportunity: Regex strings and PowerShell-in-VBS format are perfect YARA rule candidates.
![[Image: h9AAT39.gif]](https://imgur.com/h9AAT39.gif)
🔍 IOC Summary
Persistence Folder:
Code
%APPDATA%\Microsoft\SystemData\Startup VBS File Example:
Code
powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File "C:\\Users\\user\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\SystemData\\launch1234.ps1"Clipboard Hook Usage:
Code
user32.dll!AddClipboardFormatListenerRegex Patterns (Crypto Addresses):
See codebase or Regex101 for samples.
![[Image: h9AAT39.gif]](https://imgur.com/h9AAT39.gif)
📦 Stay sharp.
CoinClipper is a solid representation of how modern clipboard stealers operate: fast, stealthy, and effective against unaware users. Despite the simplicity, these tools are very successful in the wild—especially when delivered via phishing or bundled in fake wallets/cracking tools.
Spoiler (Click to View)



